Maybe you'll work for a DAO next! Over $1 Billion in NFTs in the Flamingo DAO Another DAO tried to buy the NFL team Denver Broncos. The UkraineDAO raised over $7 Million for Ukraine. The PleasrDAO paid $4m for a Wu-Tang Clan album that belonged to the “pharma bro.”
DAOs move billions and employ thousands. So learn what a DAO is, how it works, and how to create one!

DAO? So, what? Why is it better?

A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). Some people like to also refer to it as Digital Autonomous Organization, but I prefer the former.
They are virtual organizations. In the real world, you have organizations or companies right? These firms have shareholders and a board. Usually, anyone with authority makes decisions. It could be the CEO, the Board, or the HIPPO. If you own stock in that company, you may also be able to influence decisions. It's now possible to do something similar but much better and more equitable in the cryptocurrency world.

This article informs you:

DAOs- What are the most common DAOs, their advantages and disadvantages over traditional companies? What are they if any?
Is a DAO legally recognized?
How secure is a DAO?
I’m ready whenever you are!

A DAO is a type of company that is operated by smart contracts on the blockchain. Smart contracts are computer code that self-executes our commands. Those contracts can be any. Most second-generation blockchains support smart contracts. Examples are Ethereum, Solana, Polygon, Binance Smart Chain, EOS, etc. I think I've gone off topic. Back on track.   Now let's go!
Unlike traditional corporations, DAOs are governed by smart contracts. Unlike traditional company governance, DAO governance is fully transparent and auditable. That's one of the things that sets it apart. The clarity!
A DAO, like a traditional company, has one major difference. In other words, it is decentralized. DAOs are more ‘democratic' than traditional companies because anyone can vote on decisions. Anyone! In a DAO, we (you and I) make the decisions, not the top-shots. We are the CEO and investors. A DAO gives its community members power. We get to decide.
As long as you are a stakeholder, i.e. own a portion of the DAO tokens, you can participate in the DAO. Tokens are open to all. It's just a matter of exchanging it. Ownership of DAO tokens entitles you to exclusive benefits such as governance, voting, and so on. You can vote for a move, a plan, or the DAO's next investment. You can even pitch for funding. Any ‘big' decision in a DAO requires a vote from all stakeholders. In this case, ‘token-holders'! In other words, they function like stock.

What are the 5 DAO types?

Different DAOs exist. We will categorize decentralized autonomous organizations based on their mode of operation, structure, and even technology. Here are a few. You've probably heard of them:

1. DeFi DAO

These DAOs offer DeFi (decentralized financial) services via smart contract protocols. They use tokens to vote protocol and financial changes. Uniswap, Aave, Maker DAO, and Olympus DAO are some examples. Most DAOs manage billions.

Maker DAO was one of the first protocols ever created. It is a decentralized organization on the Ethereum blockchain that allows cryptocurrency lending and borrowing without a middleman.
Maker DAO issues DAI, a stable coin. DAI is a top-rated USD-pegged stable coin.
Maker DAO has an MKR token. These token holders are in charge of adjusting the Dai stable coin policy. Simply put, MKR tokens represent DAO “shares”.

2. Investment DAO

Investors pool their funds and make investment decisions. Investing in new businesses or art is one example. Investment DAOs help DeFi operations pool capital. The Meta Cartel DAO is a community of people who want to invest in new projects built on the Ethereum blockchain. Instead of investing one by one, they want to pool their resources and share ideas on how to make better financial decisions.

Other investment DAOs include the LAO and Friends with Benefits.

3. DAO Grant/Launchpad

In a grant DAO, community members contribute funds to a grant pool and vote on how to allocate and distribute them. These DAOs fund new DeFi projects. Those in need only need to apply. The Moloch DAO is a great Grant DAO. The tokens are used to allocate capital. Also see Gitcoin and Seedify.

4. DAO Collector

I debated whether to put it under ‘Investment DAO' or leave it alone. It's a subset of investment DAOs. This group buys non-fungible tokens, artwork, and collectibles. The market for NFTs has recently exploded, and it's time to investigate. The Pleasr DAO is a collector DAO. One copy of Wu-Tang Clan's "Once Upon a Time in Shaolin" cost the Pleasr DAO $4 million. Pleasr DAO is known for buying Doge meme NFT. Collector DAOs include the Flamingo, Mutant Cats DAO, and Constitution DAOs. Don't underestimate their websites' "childish" style. They have millions.

5. Social DAO

These are social networking and interaction platforms. For example, Decentraland DAO and Friends With Benefits DAO.

What are the DAO Benefits?

Here are some of the benefits of a decentralized autonomous organization:

• They are trustless. You don’t need to trust a CEO or management team
• It can’t be shut down unless a majority of the token holders agree. The government can't shut - It down because it isn't centralized.
• It's fully democratic
• It is open-source and fully transparent.

What about DAO drawbacks?

We've been saying DAOs are the bomb? But are they really the shit? What could go wrong with DAO?
DAOs may contain bugs. If they are hacked, the results can be catastrophic.
No trade secrets exist. Because the smart contract is transparent and coded on the blockchain, it can be copied. It may be used by another organization without credit. Maybe DAOs should use Secret, Oasis, or Horizen blockchain networks.

Are DAOs legally recognized??

In most counties, DAO regulation is inexistent. It's unclear. Most DAOs don’t have a legal personality. The Howey Test and the Securities Act of 1933 determine whether DAO tokens are securities. Although most countries follow the US, this is only considered for the US. Wyoming became the first state to recognize DAOs as legal entities in July 2021 after passing a DAO bill. DAOs registered in Wyoming are thus legally recognized as business entities in the US and thus receive the same legal protections as a Limited Liability Company.

In terms of cyber-security, how secure is a DAO?

Blockchains are secure. However, smart contracts may have security flaws or bugs. This can be avoided by third-party smart contract reviews, testing, and auditing

Finally, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations are timeless. Let us examine the current situation: Ukraine's invasion. A DAO was formed to help Ukrainian troops fighting the Russians. It was named Ukraine DAO. Pleasr DAO, NFT studio Trippy Labs, and Russian art collective Pussy Riot organized this fundraiser. Coindesk reports that over $3 million has been raised in Ethereum-based tokens. AidForUkraine, a DAO aimed at supporting Ukraine's defense efforts, has launched. Accepting Solana token donations. They are fully transparent, uncensorable, and can’t be shut down or sanctioned.
DAOs are undeniably the future of blockchain. Everyone is paying attention. Personally, I believe traditional companies will soon have to choose between adapting or being left behind.

You can make a proof for the statement "I know a secret number such that if you take the word ‘cow', add the number to the end, and SHA256 hash it 100 million times, the output starts with 0x57d00485aa". The verifier can verify the proof far more quickly than it would take for them to run 100 million hashes themselves, and the proof would also not reveal what the secret number is.

In the context of blockchains, this has 2 very powerful applications: Perhaps the most powerful cryptographic technology to come out of the last decade is general-purpose succinct zero knowledge proofs, usually called zk-SNARKs ("zero knowledge succinct arguments of knowledge"). A zk-SNARK allows you to generate a proof that some computation has some particular output, in such a way that the proof can be verified extremely quickly even if the underlying computation takes a very long time to run. The "ZK" part adds an additional feature: the proof can keep some of the inputs to the computation hidden.

You can make a proof for the statement "I know a secret number such that if you take the word ‘cow', add the number to the end, and SHA256 hash it 100 million times, the output starts with 0x57d00485aa". The verifier can verify the proof far more quickly than it would take for them to run 100 million hashes themselves, and the proof would also not reveal what the secret number is.

In the context of blockchains, this has two very powerful applications:

1. Scalability: if a block takes a long time to verify, one person can verify it and generate a proof, and everyone else can just quickly verify the proof instead
2. Privacy: you can prove that you have the right to transfer some asset (you received it, and you didn't already transfer it) without revealing the link to which asset you received. This ensures security without unduly leaking information about who is transacting with whom to the public.

But zk-SNARKs are quite complex; indeed, as recently as in 2014-17 they were still frequently called "moon math". The good news is that since then, the protocols have become simpler and our understanding of them has become much better. This post will try to explain how ZK-SNARKs work, in a way that should be understandable to someone with a medium level of understanding of mathematics.

Why ZK-SNARKs "should" be hard

Let us take the example that we started with: we have a number (we can encode "cow" followed by the secret input as an integer), we take the SHA256 hash of that number, then we do that again another 99,999,999 times, we get the output, and we check what its starting digits are. This is a huge computation.

A "succinct" proof is one where both the size of the proof and the time required to verify it grow much more slowly than the computation to be verified. If we want a "succinct" proof, we cannot require the verifier to do some work per round of hashing (because then the verification time would be proportional to the computation). Instead, the verifier must somehow check the whole computation without peeking into each individual piece of the computation.

One natural technique is random sampling: how about we just have the verifier peek into the computation in 500 different places, check that those parts are correct, and if all 500 checks pass then assume that the rest of the computation must with high probability be fine, too?

Such a procedure could even be turned into a non-interactive proof using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic: the prover computes a Merkle root of the computation, uses the Merkle root to pseudorandomly choose 500 indices, and provides the 500 corresponding Merkle branches of the data. The key idea is that the prover does not know which branches they will need to reveal until they have already "committed to" the data. If a malicious prover tries to fudge the data after learning which indices are going to be checked, that would change the Merkle root, which would result in a new set of random indices, which would require fudging the data again... trapping the malicious prover in an endless cycle.

But unfortunately there is a fatal flaw in naively applying random sampling to spot-check a computation in this way: computation is inherently fragile. If a malicious prover flips one bit somewhere in the middle of a computation, they can make it give a completely different result, and a random sampling verifier would almost never find out.

It only takes one deliberately inserted error, that a random check would almost never catch, to make a computation give a completely incorrect result.

If tasked with the problem of coming up with a zk-SNARK protocol, many people would make their way to this point and then get stuck and give up. How can a verifier possibly check every single piece of the computation, without looking at each piece of the computation individually? There is a clever solution.

When a seller has a limited supply of an item in high (or uncertain and possibly high) demand, they frequently set a price far below what "the market will bear." As a result, the item sells out quickly, with lucky buyers being those who tried to buy first. This has happened in the Ethereum ecosystem, particularly with NFT sales and token sales/ICOs. But this phenomenon is much older; concerts and restaurants frequently make similar choices, resulting in fast sell-outs or long lines.

Why do sellers do this? Economists have long wondered. A seller should sell at the market-clearing price if the amount buyers are willing to buy exactly equals the amount the seller has to sell. If the seller is unsure of the market-clearing price, they should sell at auction and let the market decide. So, if you want to sell something below market value, don't do it. It will hurt your sales and it will hurt your customers. The competitions created by non-price-based allocation mechanisms can sometimes have negative externalities that harm third parties, as we will see.

However, the prevalence of below-market-clearing pricing suggests that sellers do it for good reason. And indeed, as decades of research into this topic has shown, there often are. So, is it possible to achieve the same goals with less unfairness, inefficiency, and harm?

Selling at below market-clearing prices has large inefficiencies and negative externalities

An item that is sold at market value or at an auction allows someone who really wants it to pay the high price or bid high in the auction. So, if a seller sells an item below market value, some people will get it and others won't. But the mechanism deciding who gets the item isn't random, and it's not always well correlated with participant desire. It's not always about being the fastest at clicking buttons. Sometimes it means waking up at 2 a.m. (but 11 p.m. or even 2 p.m. elsewhere). Sometimes it's just a "auction by other means" that's more chaotic, less efficient, and has far more negative externalities.

There are many examples of this in the Ethereum ecosystem. Let's start with the 2017 ICO craze. For example, an ICO project would set the price of the token and a hard maximum for how many tokens they are willing to sell, and the sale would start automatically at some point in time. The sale ends when the cap is reached.

So what? In practice, these sales often ended in 30 seconds or less. Everyone would start sending transactions in as soon as (or just before) the sale started, offering higher and higher fees to encourage miners to include their transaction first. Instead of the token seller receiving revenue, miners receive it, and the sale prices out all other applications on-chain.

The most expensive transaction in the BAT sale set a fee of 580,000 gwei, paying a fee of $6,600 to get included in the sale.

Many ICOs after that tried various strategies to avoid these gas price auctions; one ICO notably had a smart contract that checked the transaction's gasprice and rejected it if it exceeded 50 gwei. But that didn't solve the issue. Buyers hoping to game the system sent many transactions hoping one would get through. An auction by another name, clogging the chain even more.

ICOs have recently lost popularity, but NFTs and NFT sales have risen in popularity. But the NFT space didn't learn from 2017; they do fixed-quantity sales just like ICOs (eg. see the mint function on lines 97-108 of this contract here). So what?

That's not the worst; some NFT sales have caused gas price spikes of up to 2000 gwei.

High gas prices from users fighting to get in first by sending higher and higher transaction fees. An auction renamed, pricing out all other applications on-chain for 15 minutes.

So why do sellers sometimes sell below market price?

Selling below market value is nothing new, and many articles, papers, and podcasts have written (and sometimes bitterly complained) about the unwillingness to use auctions or set prices to market-clearing levels.

Many of the arguments are the same for both blockchain (NFTs and ICOs) and non-blockchain examples (popular restaurants and concerts). Fairness and the desire not to exclude the poor, lose fans or create tension by being perceived as greedy are major concerns. The 1986 paper by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler explains how fairness and greed can influence these decisions. I recall that the desire to avoid perceptions of greed was also a major factor in discouraging the use of auction-like mechanisms in 2017.

Aside from fairness concerns, there is the argument that selling out and long lines create a sense of popularity and prestige, making the product more appealing to others. Long lines should have the same effect as high prices in a rational actor model, but this is not the case in reality. This applies to ICOs and NFTs as well as restaurants. Aside from increasing marketing value, some people find the game of grabbing a limited set of opportunities first before everyone else is quite entertaining.

But there are some blockchain-specific factors. One argument for selling ICO tokens below market value (and one that persuaded the OmiseGo team to adopt their capped sale strategy) is community dynamics. The first rule of community sentiment management is to encourage price increases. People are happy if they are "in the green." If the price drops below what the community members paid, they are unhappy and start calling you a scammer, possibly causing a social media cascade where everyone calls you a scammer.

This effect can only be avoided by pricing low enough that post-launch market prices will almost certainly be higher. But how do you do this without creating a rush for the gates that leads to an auction?

Interesting solutions

It's 2021. We have a blockchain. The blockchain is home to a powerful decentralized finance ecosystem, as well as a rapidly expanding set of non-financial tools. The blockchain also allows us to reset social norms. Where decades of economists yelling about "efficiency" failed, blockchains may be able to legitimize new uses of mechanism design. If we could use our more advanced tools to create an approach that more directly solves the problems, with fewer side effects, wouldn't that be better than fiddling with a coarse-grained one-dimensional strategy space of selling at market price versus below market price?

Begin with the goals. We'll try to cover ICOs, NFTs, and conference tickets (really a type of NFT) all at the same time.

1. Fairness: don't completely exclude low-income people from participation; give them a chance. The goal of token sales is to avoid high initial wealth concentration and have a larger and more diverse initial token holder community.

2. Don’t create races: Avoid situations where many people rush to do the same thing and only a few get in (this is the type of situation that leads to the horrible auctions-by-another-name that we saw above).

3. Don't require precise market knowledge: the mechanism should work even if the seller has no idea how much demand exists.

4. Fun: The process of participating in the sale should be fun and game-like, but not frustrating.

5. Give buyers positive expected returns: in the case of a token (or an NFT), buyers should expect price increases rather than decreases. This requires selling below market value.
Let's start with (1). From Ethereum's perspective, there is a simple solution. Use a tool designed for the job: proof of personhood protocols! Here's one quick idea:

With the per-person mechanism, buyers can get positive expected returns for the portion sold through the per-person mechanism, and the auction part does not require sellers to understand demand levels. Is it race-free? The number of participants buying through the per-person pool appears to be high. But what if the per-person pool isn't big enough to accommodate everyone?

Make the per-person allocation amount dynamic.

Here's another idea if you like clever game mechanics with fancy quadratic formulas.

The quantity allocated to each buyer is theoretically optimal, though post-sale transfers will degrade this optimality over time. Mechanisms 2 and 3 appear to meet all of the above objectives. They're not perfect, but they're good starting points.

One more issue. For fixed and limited supply NFTs, the equilibrium purchased quantity per participant may be fractional (in mechanism 2, number of buyers > N, and in mechanism 3, setting C = 1 may already lead to over-subscription). With fractional sales, you can offer lottery tickets: if there are N items available, you have a chance of N/number of buyers of getting the item, otherwise you get a refund. For a conference, groups could bundle their lottery tickets to guarantee a win or a loss. The certainty of getting the item can be auctioned.

The bottom tier of "sponsorships" can be used to sell conference tickets at market rate. You may end up with a sponsor board full of people's faces, but is that okay? After all, John Lilic was on EthCC's sponsor board!

Simply put, if you want to be reliably fair to people, you need an input that explicitly measures people. Authentication protocols do this (and if desired can be combined with zero knowledge proofs to ensure privacy). So we should combine the efficiency of market and auction-based pricing with the equality of proof of personhood mechanics.

Answers to possible questions

Q: Won't people who don't care about your project buy the item and immediately resell it?

A: Not at first. Meta-games take time to appear in practice. If they do, making them untradeable for a while may help mitigate the damage. Using your face to claim that your previous account was hacked and that your identity, including everything in it, should be moved to another account works because proof-of-personhood identities are untradeable.

Q: What if I want to make my item available to a specific community?

A: Instead of ID, use proof of participation tokens linked to community events. Another option, also serving egalitarian and gamification purposes, is to encrypt items within publicly available puzzle solutions.

Q: How do we know they'll accept? Strange new mechanisms have previously been resisted.

A: Having economists write screeds about how they "should" accept a new mechanism that they find strange is difficult (or even "equity"). However, abrupt changes in context effectively reset people's expectations. So the blockchain space is the best place to try this. You could wait for the "metaverse", but it's possible that the best version will run on Ethereum anyway, so start now.