New standards help NFTs reach their full potential.

NFTs lack interoperability and functionality. They have great potential but are mostly speculative. To maximize NFTs, we need flexible smart contracts.

Current requirements are too restrictive.

Most NFTs are based on ERC-721, which makes exchanging them easy. CryptoKitties, a popular online game, used the 2017 standard to demonstrate NFTs' potential.

This simple standard includes a base URI and incremental IDs for tokens. Add the tokenID to the base URI to get the token's metadata.

This let creators collect NFTs. Many NFT projects store metadata on IPFS, a distributed storage network, but others use Google Drive. NFT buyers often don't realize that if the creators delete or move the files, their NFT is just a pointer.

This isn't the standard's biggest issue. There's no way to validate NFT projects.

Creators are one of the most important aspects of art, but nothing is stored on-chain.

ERC-721 contracts only have a name and symbol.

Most of the data on OpenSea's collection pages isn't from the NFT's smart contract. It was added through a platform input field, so it's in the marketplace's database. Other websites may have different NFT information.

In five years, your NFT will be just a name, symbol, and ID.

Your NFT doesn't mention its creators. Although the smart contract has a public key, it doesn't reveal who created it.

The NFT's creators and their reputation are crucial to its value. Think digital fashion and big brands working with well-known designers when more professionals use NFTs. Don't you want them in your NFT?

Would paintings be as valuable if their artists were unknown? Would you believe it's real?

Buying directly from an on-chain artist would reduce scams. Current standards don't allow this data.

Most creator profiles live on centralized marketplaces and could disappear. Current platforms have outpaced underlying standards. The industry's standards are lagging.

For NFTs to grow beyond pointers to a monkey picture file, we may need to use new Web3-based standards.

Introducing NFTs 2.0

Fabian Vogelsteller, creator of ERC-20, developed new web3 standards. He proposed LSP7 Digital Asset and LSP8 Identifiable Digital Asset, also called NFT 2.0.

NFT and token metadata inputs are extendable. Changes to on-chain metadata inputs allow NFTs to evolve. Instead of public keys, the contract can have Universal Profile addresses attached. These profiles show creators' faces and reputations. NFTs can notify asset receivers, automating smart contracts.

LSP7 and LSP8 use ERC725Y. Using a generic data key-value store gives contracts much-needed features:

• The asset can be customized and made to stand out more by allowing for unlimited data attachment.

• Recognizing changes to the metadata

• using a hash reference for metadata rather than a URL reference

This base will allow more metadata customization and upgradeability. These guidelines are:

• Genuine and Verifiable Now, the creation of an NFT by a specific Universal Profile can be confirmed by smart contracts.

• Dynamic NFTs can update Flexible & Updatable Metadata, allowing certain things to evolve over time.

• Protected metadata Now, secure metadata that is readable by smart contracts can be added indefinitely.

• Better NFTS prevent the locking of NFTs by only being sent to Universal Profiles or a smart contract that can interact with them.

Summary

NFTS standards lack standardization and powering features, limiting the industry.

ERC-721 is the most popular NFT standard, but it only represents incremental tokenIDs without metadata or asset representation. No standard sender-receiver interaction or security measures ensure safe asset transfers.

NFT 2.0 refers to the new LSP7-DigitalAsset and LSP8-IdentifiableDigitalAsset standards.

They have new standards for flexible metadata, secure transfers, asset representation, and interactive transfer.

With NFTs 2.0 and Universal Profiles, creators could build on-chain reputations.

NFTs 2.0 could bring the industry's needed innovation if it wants to move beyond trading profile pictures for speculation.

Open to ideas or acquisitions

Failure is an unavoidable aspect of life, yet many recoil at the word.

I've worked on unrelated startup projects. This is a list of products I developed (often as the tech lead or co-founder) and why they failed to launch.

Chess Bet (Betting)

As a chess player who plays 5 games a day and has an ELO rating of 2100, I tried to design a chess engine to rival stockfish and Houdini.

While constructing my chess engine, my cofounder asked me about building a p2p chess betting app. Chess Bet. There couldn't be a better time.

Two people in different locations could play a staked game. The winner got 90% of the bet and we got 10%. The business strategy was clear, but our mini-launch was unusual.

People started employing the same cheat engines I mentioned, causing user churn and defaming our product.

It was the first programming problem I couldn't solve after building a cheat detection system based on player move strengths and prior games. Chess.com, the most famous online chess software, still suffers from this.

We decided to pivot because we needed an expensive betting license.

We relaunched as Chess MVP after deciding to focus on chess learning. A platform for teachers to create chess puzzles and teach content. Several chess students used our product, but the target market was too tiny.

We chose to quit rather than persevere or pivot.

BodaCare (Insure Tech)

‘BodaBoda’ in Swahili means Motorcycle. My Dad approached me in 2019 (when I was working for a health tech business) about establishing an Insurtech/fintech solution for motorbike riders to pay for insurance using SNPL.

We teamed up with an underwriter to market motorcycle insurance. Once they had enough premiums, they'd get an insurance sticker in the mail. We made it better by splitting the cover in two, making it more reasonable for motorcyclists struggling with lump-sum premiums.

Lack of capital and changing customer behavior forced us to close, with 100 motorcyclists paying 0.5 USD every day. Our unit econ didn't make sense, and CAC and retention capital only dug us deeper.

Circle (Social Networking)

Having learned from both product failures, I began to understand what worked and what didn't. While reading through Instagram, an idea struck me.

Suppose social media weren't virtual.

Imagine meeting someone on your way home. Like-minded person

People were excited about social occasions after covid restrictions were eased. Anything to escape. I just built a university student-popular experiences startup. Again, there couldn't be a better time.

I started the Android app. I launched it on Google Beta and oh my! 200 people joined in two days.

It works by signaling if people are in a given place and allowing users to IM in hopes of meeting up in near real-time. Playstore couldn't deploy the app despite its success in beta for unknown reasons. I appealed unsuccessfully.

My infrastructure quickly lost users because I lacked funding.

In conclusion

This essay contains many failures, some of which might have been avoided and others not, but they were crucial learning points in my startup path.

If you liked any idea, I have the source code on Github.

Happy reading until then!

Disclaimer : This is not financial advice for any investment.

TL;DR

• You might not have realized it, but as we move toward net zero carbon emissions, the globe is already at war.

• According to the Paris Agreement of COP26, 64% of nations have already declared net zero, and the issue of carbon reduction has already become so important for businesses that it affects their ability to survive. Furthermore, the time when carbon emission standards will be defined and controlled on an individual basis is becoming closer.

• Since 2017, the market for carbon credits has experienced extraordinary expansion as a result of widespread talks about carbon credits. The carbon credit market is predicted to expand much more once net zero is implemented and carbon emission rules inevitably tighten.

Hello! Ben here from Nonce Classic. Nonce Classic has recently confirmed the tremendous growth potential of the carbon credit market in the midst of a major trend towards the global goal of net zero (carbon emissions caused by humans — carbon reduction by humans = 0 ). Moreover, we too believed that the questions and issues the carbon credit market suffered from the last 30–40yrs could be perfectly answered through crypto technology and that is why we have added a carbon credit crypto project to the Nonce Classic portfolio. There have been many teams out there that have tried to solve environmental problems through crypto but very few that have measurable experience working in the carbon credit scene. Thus we have put in our efforts to find projects that are not crypto projects created for the sake of issuing tokens but projects that pragmatically use crypto technology to combat climate change by solving problems of the current carbon credit market. In that process, we came to hear of Climate Coin, a veritable carbon credit crypto project, and us Nonce Classic as an accelerator, have begun contributing to its growth and invested in its tokens. Starting with this article, we plan to publish a series of articles explaining why the carbon credit market is bullish, why we invested in Climate Coin, and what kind of project Climate Coin is specifically. In this first article let us understand the carbon credit market and look into its growth potential! Let’s begin :)

The Unavoidable Entry of the Net Zero Era

Net zero means... Human carbon emissions are balanced by carbon reduction efforts. A non-environmentalist may find it hard to accept that net zero is attainable by 2050. Global cooperation to save the earth is happening faster than we imagine.

In the Paris Agreement of COP26, concluded in Glasgow, UK on Oct. 31, 2021, nations pledged to reduce worldwide yearly greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50% by 2030 and attain net zero by 2050. Governments throughout the world have pledged net zero at the national level and are holding each other accountable by submitting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) every five years to assess implementation. 127 of 198 nations have declared net zero.

Each country's 1.5-degree reduction plans have led to carbon reduction obligations for companies. In places with the strictest environmental regulations, like the EU, companies often face bankruptcy because the cost of buying carbon credits to meet their carbon allowances exceeds their operating profits. In this day and age, minimizing carbon emissions and securing carbon credits are crucial.

Recent SEC actions on climate change may increase companies' concerns about reducing emissions. The SEC required all U.S. stock market companies to disclose their annual greenhouse gas emissions and climate change impact on March 21, 2022. The SEC prepared the proposed regulation through in-depth analysis and stakeholder input since last year. Three out of four SEC members agreed that it should pass without major changes. If the regulation passes, it will affect not only US companies, but also countless companies around the world, directly or indirectly.

Even companies not listed on the U.S. stock market will be affected and, in most cases, required to disclose emissions. Companies listed on the U.S. stock market with significant greenhouse gas emissions or specific targets are subject to stricter emission standards (Scope 3) and disclosure obligations, which will magnify investigations into all related companies. Greenhouse gas emissions can be calculated three ways. Scope 1 measures carbon emissions from a company's facilities and transportation. Scope 2 measures carbon emissions from energy purchases. Scope 3 covers all indirect emissions from a company's value chains.

The SEC's proposed carbon emission disclosure mandate and regulations are one example of how carbon credit policies can cross borders and affect all parties. As such incidents will continue throughout the implementation of net zero, even companies that are not immediately obligated to disclose their carbon emissions must be prepared to respond to changes in carbon emission laws and policies.

Carbon reduction obligations will soon become individual. Individual consumption has increased dramatically with improved quality of life and convenience, despite national and corporate efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Since consumption is directly related to carbon emissions, increasing consumption increases carbon emissions. Countries around the world have agreed that to achieve net zero, carbon emissions must be reduced on an individual level. Solutions to individual carbon reduction are being actively discussed and studied under the term Personal Carbon Trading (PCT).

PCT is a system that allows individuals to trade carbon emission quotas in the form of carbon credits. Individuals who emit more carbon than their allotment can buy carbon credits from those who emit less. European cities with well-established carbon credit markets are preparing for net zero by conducting early carbon reduction prototype projects. The era of checking product labels for carbon footprints, choosing low-emissions transportation, and worrying about hot shower emissions is closer than we think.

The Market for Carbon Credits Is Expanding Fearfully

Compliance and voluntary carbon markets make up the carbon credit market.

A Compliance Market enforces carbon emission allowances for actors. Companies in industries that previously emitted a lot of carbon are included in the mandatory carbon market, and each government receives carbon credits each year. If a company's emissions are less than the assigned cap and it has extra carbon credits, it can sell them to other companies that have larger emissions and require them (Cap and Trade). The annual number of free emission permits provided to companies is designed to decline, therefore companies' desire for carbon credits will increase. The compliance market's yearly trading volume will exceed $261B in 2020, five times its 2017 level.

In the Voluntary Market, carbon reduction is voluntary and carbon credits are sold for personal reasons or to build market participants' eco-friendly reputations. Even if not in the compliance market, it is typical for a corporation to be obliged to offset its carbon emissions by acquiring voluntary carbon credits. When a company seeks government or company investment, it may be denied because it is not net zero. If a significant shareholder declares net zero, the companies below it must execute it. As the world moves toward ESG management, becoming an eco-friendly company is no longer a strategic choice to gain a competitive edge, but an important precaution to not fall behind. Due to this eco-friendly trend, the annual market volume of voluntary emission credits will approach $1B by November 2021. The voluntary credit market is anticipated to reach $5B to $50B by 2030. (TSCVM 2021 Report)

In conclusion

This article analyzed how net zero, a target promised by countries around the world to combat climate change, has brought governmental, corporate, and human changes. We discussed how these shifts will become more obvious as we approach net zero, and how the carbon credit market would increase exponentially in response. In the following piece, let's analyze the hurdles impeding the carbon credit market's growth, how the project we invested in tries to tackle these issues, and why we chose Climate Coin. Wait! Jim Skea, co-chair of the IPCC working group, said,

“It’s now or never, if we want to limit global warming to 1.5°C” — Jim Skea

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Sam Bankman Fried (SDBF) is a legendary con man. But the NYT might not tell you that...

Since SBF's empire was revealed to be a lie, mainstream news organizations and commentators have failed to give readers a straightforward assessment. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have uncovered many key facts about the scandal, but they have also soft-peddled Bankman-Fried's intent and culpability.

It's clear that the FTX crypto exchange and Alameda Research committed fraud to steal money from users and investors. That’s why a recent New York Times interview was widely derided for seeming to frame FTX’s collapse as the result of mismanagement rather than malfeasance. A Wall Street Journal article lamented FTX's loss of charitable donations, bolstering Bankman's philanthropic pose. Matthew Yglesias, court chronicler of the neoliberal status quo, seemed to whitewash his own entanglements by crediting SBF's money with helping Democrats in 2020 – sidestepping the likelihood that the money was embezzled.

Many outlets have called what happened to FTX a "bank run" or a "run on deposits," but Bankman-Fried insists the company was overleveraged and disorganized. Both attempts to frame the fallout obscure the core issue: customer funds misused.

Because banks lend customer funds to generate returns, they can experience "bank runs." If everyone withdraws at once, they can experience a short-term cash crunch but there won't be a long-term problem.

Crypto exchanges like FTX aren't banks. They don't do bank-style lending, so a withdrawal surge shouldn't strain liquidity. FTX promised customers it wouldn't lend or use their crypto.

Alameda's balance sheet blurs SBF's crypto empire.

The funds were sent to Alameda Research, where they were apparently gambled away. This is massive theft. According to a bankruptcy document, up to 1 million customers could be affected.

In less than a month, reporting and the bankruptcy process have uncovered a laundry list of decisions and practices that would constitute financial fraud if FTX had been a U.S.-regulated entity, even without crypto-specific rules. These ploys may be litigated in U.S. courts if they enabled the theft of American property.

The list is very, very long.

The many crimes of Sam Bankman-Fried and FTX

At the heart of SBF's fraud are the deep and (literally) intimate ties between FTX and Alameda Research, a hedge fund he co-founded. An exchange makes money from transaction fees on user assets, but Alameda trades and invests its own funds.

Bankman-Fried called FTX and Alameda "wholly separate" and resigned as Alameda's CEO in 2019. The two operations were closely linked. Bankman-Fried and Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison were romantically linked.

These circumstances enabled SBF's sin.  Within days of FTX's first signs of weakness, it was clear the exchange was funneling customer assets to Alameda for trading, lending, and investing. Reuters reported on Nov. 12 that FTX sent $10 billion to Alameda. As much as $2 billion was believed to have disappeared after being sent to Alameda. Now the losses look worse.

It's unclear why those funds were sent to Alameda or when Bankman-Fried betrayed his depositors. On-chain analysis shows most FTX to Alameda transfers occurred in late 2021, and bankruptcy filings show both lost $3.7 billion in 2021.

SBF's companies lost millions before the 2022 crypto bear market. They may have stolen funds before Terra and Three Arrows Capital, which killed many leveraged crypto players.

FTT loans and prints

CoinDesk's report on Alameda's FTT holdings ignited FTX and Alameda Research. FTX created this instrument, but only a small portion was traded publicly; FTX and Alameda held the rest. These holdings were illiquid, meaning they couldn't be sold at market price. Bankman-Fried valued its stock at the fictitious price.

FTT tokens were reportedly used as collateral for loans, including FTX loans to Alameda. Close ties between FTX and Alameda made the FTT token harder or more expensive to use as collateral, reducing the risk to customer funds.

This use of an internal asset as collateral for loans between clandestinely related entities is similar to Enron's 1990s accounting fraud. These executives served 12 years in prison.

Alameda's margin liquidation exemption

Alameda Research had a "secret exemption" from FTX's liquidation and margin trading rules, according to legal filings by FTX's new CEO.

FTX, like other crypto platforms and some equity or commodity services, offered "margin" or loans for trades. These loans are usually collateralized, meaning borrowers put up other funds or assets. If a margin trade loses enough money, the exchange will sell the user's collateral to pay off the initial loan.

Keeping asset markets solvent requires liquidating bad margin positions. Exempting Alameda would give it huge advantages while exposing other FTX users to hidden risks. Alameda could have kept losing positions open while closing out competitors. Alameda could lose more on FTX than it could pay back, leaving a hole in customer funds.

The exemption is criminal in multiple ways. FTX was fraudulently marketed overall. Instead of a level playing field, there were many customers.

Above them all, with shotgun poised, was Alameda Research.

Alameda front-running FTX listings

Argus says there's circumstantial evidence that Alameda Research had insider knowledge of FTX's token listing plans. Alameda was able to buy large amounts of tokens before the listing and sell them after the price bump.

If true, these claims would be the most brazenly illegal of Alameda and FTX's alleged shenanigans. Even if the tokens aren't formally classified as securities, insider trading laws may apply.

In a similar case this year, an OpenSea employee was charged with wire fraud for allegedly insider trading. This employee faces 20 years in prison for front-running monkey JPEGs.

Huge loans to executives

Alameda Research reportedly lent FTX executives $4.1 billion, including massive personal loans. Bankman-Fried received $1 billion in personal loans and $2.3 billion for an entity he controlled, Paper Bird. Nishad Singh, director of engineering, was given $543 million, and FTX Digital Markets co-CEO Ryan Salame received $55 million.

FTX has more smoking guns than a Texas shooting range, but this one is the smoking bazooka – a sign of criminal intent. It's unclear how most of the personal loans were used, but liquidators will have to recoup the money.

The loans to Paper Bird were even more worrisome because they created another related third party to shuffle assets. Forbes speculates that some Paper Bird funds went to buy Binance's FTX stake, and Paper Bird committed hundreds of millions to outside investments.

FTX Inner Circle: Who's Who

That included many FTX-backed VC funds. Time will tell if this financial incest was criminal fraud. It fits Bankman-pattern Fried's of using secret flows, leverage, and funny money to inflate asset prices.

FTT or loan 'bailouts'

Also. As the crypto bear market continued in 2022, Bankman-Fried proposed bailouts for bankrupt crypto lenders BlockFi and Voyager Digital. CoinDesk was among those deceived, welcoming SBF as a J.P. Morgan-style sector backstop.

In a now-infamous interview with CNBC's "Squawk Box," Bankman-Fried referred to these decisions as bets that may or may not pay off.

But maybe not. Bloomberg's Matt Levine speculated that FTX backed BlockFi with FTT money. This Monopoly bailout may have been intended to hide FTX and Alameda liabilities that would have been exposed if BlockFi went bankrupt sooner. This ploy has no name, but it echoes other corporate frauds.

Secret bank purchase

Alameda Research invested $11.5 million in the tiny Farmington State Bank, doubling its net worth. As a non-U.S. entity and an investment firm, Alameda should have cleared regulatory hurdles before acquiring a U.S. bank.

In the context of FTX, the bank's stake becomes "ominous." Alameda and FTX could have done more shenanigans with bank control. Compare this to the Bank for Credit and Commerce International's failed attempts to buy U.S. banks. BCCI was even nefarious than FTX and wanted to buy U.S. banks to expand its money-laundering empire.

The mainstream's mistakes

These are complex and nuanced forms of fraud that echo traditional finance models. This obscurity helped Bankman-Fried masquerade as an honest player and likely kept coverage soft after the collapse.

Bankman-Fried had a scruffy, nerdy image, like Mark Zuckerberg and Adam Neumann. In interviews, he spoke nonsense about an industry full of jargon and complicated tech. Strategic donations and insincere ideological statements helped him gain political and social influence.

SBF' s'Effective' Altruism Blew Up FTX

Bankman-Fried has continued to muddy the waters with disingenuous letters, statements, interviews, and tweets since his con collapsed. He's tried to portray himself as a well-intentioned but naive kid who made some mistakes. This is a softer, more pernicious version of what Trump learned from mob lawyer Roy Cohn. Bankman-Fried doesn't "deny, deny, deny" but "confuse, evade, distort."

It's mostly worked. Kevin O'Leary, who plays an investor on "Shark Tank," repeats Bankman-SBF's counterfactuals.  O'Leary called Bankman-Fried a "savant" and "probably one of the most accomplished crypto traders in the world" in a Nov. 27 interview with Business Insider, despite recent data indicating immense trading losses even when times were good.

O'Leary's status as an FTX investor and former paid spokesperson explains his continued affection for Bankman-Fried despite contradictory evidence. He's not the only one promoting Bankman-Fried. The disgraced son of two Stanford law professors will defend himself at Wednesday's DealBook Summit.

SBF's fraud and theft rival those of Bernie Madoff and Jho Low. Whether intentionally or through malign ineptitude, the fraud echoes Worldcom and Enron.

The Perverse Impacts of Anti-Money-Laundering

The principals in all of those scandals wound up either sentenced to prison or on the run from the law. Sam Bankman-Fried clearly deserves to share their fate.

Read the full article here.